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Abstract 
 
We explore how outcomes of trade policy retaliation (Nash tariff games) are affected when 
trade simultaneously takes places geographically across countries and through time via 
financial intermediation. In such models deficits and surpluses in goods trade are 
endogenously determined, and retaliatory trade policy towards goods can affect these and 
monetary trade models show different retaliatory trade outcomes from conventional goods 
only models. We use a general equilibrium goods trade model which also captures trade 
through time in the form of inside money as used in macro literature on one good overlapping 
generations models. In this model the deficit or surplus of any country in goods trade is 
endogenous determined. Optimal trade policy differs from that in a conventional goods only 
trade model in that countries which run trade deficits in goods will have more strategic power 
through tariff policy (and surplus countries less) than in models with balanced trade. We 
calibrate such a model to China’s trade with the rest of the world and explore two country 
tariff games using 2005 data. Results show the significant impacts on Nash outcomes of 
endogenizing the Chinese trade surplus in the model in this way. 
JEL Code: F13. 
Keywords: inside money, general equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, numerical analysis, tariff 
rate. 
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We discuss how trade retaliation in monetary trade models diﬀers from trade retaliation in
classical goods only barter models as in Johnson (1953), Gorman (1958), Kuga (1973), Hamilton
and Whalley (1983) and others. In such models trade surpluses and deﬁcits are endogenously
determined and countries with trade deﬁcits (surpluses) typically have more (less) retaliatory
power than in models with balanced trade.
Models in which trade takes place geographically across countries and through time in
ﬁnancial assets simultaneously are little explored in the literature. Traditional trade models
impose a classical separation between real and monetary sides, while models of inter-temporal
exchange usually limit themselves to one good. This is inherently unsatisfactory, however,
if one is considering trade policy responses in economies such as the US with a large trade
deﬁcit, or China with a large trade surplus. If trade interventions aﬀect the price of inter-
temporal exchange, optimal policy needs to be appropriately modiﬁed. Countries which run
large deﬁcits in goods trade will typically have more retaliatory power compared to balanced
trade, and countries running surpluses less. Outcomes of Nash tariﬀ games will thus be aﬀected.
We present a simple multi-good multi-country trade model which also captures trade through
time in the form of inside money as used in macro literature. Trade through time and space can
be thought of as comparable, and inside money (debt) issued by one country will in equilibrium
oﬀset inside money (debt) acquired by the other. The equilibrium price of debt will determine
an interest factor, which along with the commodity terms of trade can be changed by trade
policy interventions. Optimal trade policy for single countries will therefore diﬀer from that in
a conventional goods only trade model with balanced trade in goods, and outcomes of Nash
tariﬀ games will be similarly aﬀected. If a country runs a trade surplus, their no response opti-
mal tariﬀ is signiﬁcantly lowered. Comparing trade retaliation within the same framework also
allows us to assess Nash equilibria in tariﬀs between the two countries both with and without
the added element of inter-temporal trade.
We show how a monetary trade model can be constructed for the 2 country 2 good case,
and, for simplicity, consider a simple pure exchange case. Such a model has no closed form
solution, but it can be used for numerical analysis. Model solutions using model speciﬁcations
calibrated to 2005 Chinese/Rest-of-World (ROW) data are used ﬁrst to analyze individual
country optimal policy in this framework assuming no strategic response from the partner
country. Results indicate the additional impacts of considering inside money eﬀects depend
upon both country diﬀerences in rates of time preference, and the relative size of commodity
2and inter-temporal trade, and the additional eﬀects involved can be substantial.
The conclusion we oﬀer is that in today’s world of signiﬁcant current account surpluses and
deﬁcits across large trading entities (U.S., China, for example) using conventional balanced
trade (or exogenous trade imbalance) models will typically be misleading as a way to analyze
optimal trade policy interventions. Trade deﬁcit countries will typically have higher optimal
tariﬀs and trade surplus countries have lower optimal tariﬀs than balanced trade models suggest.
While models with endogenous trade imbalances may not yield analytical closed form solutions,
in numerical simulation work there seems little reason not to use models with such monetary
trade interactions. This is especially so when evaluating trade policy options and outcomes of
Nash tariﬀ games.
32 A Simple 2 Good, 2 Country Trade Model with Inside Money
We ﬁrst present a conventional trade model with trade in goods to which monetary structure
using inside money is added. This then allows for endogenous determination of trade imbalances
for trade in goods, oﬀset through inter-temporal trade in money (or assets).
We build on modern macro-literature (see Azariadis (1993) pages 175 - 180) in which there
is extensive use made of simple overlapping generations models with inside money. Trade in
commodities, either between individuals or across countries is usually not explicitly included
in such macro literature, in part for tractability but in part also due to the focus on inter-
temporal allocation rather than allocation within periods. But when analyzing trade it is the
interaction between monetary structure and commodity trade that is at issue, and models with
simultaneous inter-temporal and inter-commodity structure are needed. This is especially the
case for analysis of contemporary trade issues currently given the large trade imbalances in
economics such as China and the U.S.
In such macro-models there is typically a population of households H which grows geometri-
cally at some rate n. There is usually a single consumption good, which must be fully consumed
in the period (i.e. no storage is allowed). Each household h is endowed with an amount of the
consumption good in each of two periods Eyh ≥ 0 when young, and Eoh ≥ 0 when old.
With no chance to trade endowments, households are limited to autarkic consumption. But
if households are relatively patient or relatively well endowed when young, then households are
willing to give up consumption when young in return for commitments to be honoured by the
next generation’s young to repay with consumption in the future. An agreement between two
households to exchange consumption between two periods can be thought as a contract which
acts as a store of value. The stock of such loans outstanding at any date t is the amount of
credit, or inside money.
In these models, if household h has demands for consumption Cyh when young and Coh
when old, excess demands for consumption at each age, Xyh = Cyh−Eyh and Xoh = Coh−Eoh,
are related through the life time budget constraint
Xyh +
Xoh
R
≤ 0 (2.1)
where R is the interest factor which applies to loan contracts which exchange one unit of
consumption in period t for R > 0 units of consumption in the next period (t + 1).
The debt issued by the young will vary with R, and can be written as the negative of their
4excess demands, i.e.
−Xyh = Sh(R) (2.2)
where Sh(R) represents either saving or accumulation of debt of the young household.
In equilibrium, inter-temporal trades will be generated between young and old households
such that in period t
Ct
yh = Et
yh − Sh(R) and Ct
oh = Et
oh + RSh(R). (2.3)
If young and old consumption are gross substitutes (i.e. demand for each dated consumption
good is increasing in the price of the other) then all equilibria represented by (3) will be unique.
Following Buiter (1981) this economy can also be generalized to a simple two country (1
and 2) world where countries diﬀer in their rates of time preference. In autarky each economy
will be characterized by an interest factor Ri(i = 1,2). If residents of 2 have higher rates of
time preference than those of 1 (i.e. are more patient) then
RA
1 > RA
2 (2.4)
where RA
1 and RA
2 represent the loan interest factors in autarky.
In this case with intertemporal trade across countries, there will be a common interest rate
R and the relatively impatient young in country 1 will dissave and import goods from country 2
and issue liabilities through commitments to pay interest to foreign residents. In this structure,
imports are ﬁnanced by debt acquired by foreigners.
If growth in the integrated economy occurs at the population growth rate n, imports by
country 1, M1, can be written in per capita form as
M1 =
"
E1
y +
E1
y
1 + n
#
−

E1
o +
E1
o
1 + n

(2.5)
and the per capita current account deﬁcit can be written as
A1 = M1 −
RS1
1 + n
(2.6)
where S1 is debt issuance in country 1 and R is the common interest factor between the two
countries.
Given that S1 = E1
y − C1
y and RS1 = C1
o − E1
o, then
M1 =
R − 1
1 + n
S1 (2.7)
5and A1 = S1.
In this simple one good economy, the trade imbalance grows at the rate n, and the home
country is a net importer of goods because in each period the young import more than the old
export in order to retire debt.
To develop a multi-commodity trade model with this monetary structure, we could gener-
alize the above to a case where there are two goods in each period and allow inter-commodity
trade to co-exist within the period along with trade in debt in the form of inside money. Instead,
we simplify things by using a single period model where either claims on future consumption
(money holdings) or future consumption liabilities (money issuance) enter the utility function.
This is the literature formulation of inside money used by Patinkin (1971), and earlier by
Archibald and Lipsey (1958). This also allows for a simpler multi-country model structure with
trade in both goods and assets(inside money).
We consider a two country (i = 1,2) and two good (l = 1,2) pure exchange general equilib-
rium model in which claims on future consumption enter preferences and are traded between
countries. In this, each country has a single representative consumer, with endowments of the
two goods (Eil; i = 1,2, l = 1,2) and can either issue or buy claims on future consumption
using current period income. For simplicity, we use Cobb-Douglas utility functions
U1(X11,X12,Y1) = X
α11
11 X
α12
12 Y
α13
1 , α11 + α12 + α13 = 1 (2.8)
U2(X21,X22,Y2) = X
α21
21 X
α22
22 [Y 0 − Y2]α23, α21 + α22 + α23 = 1 (2.9)
where Xil denotes the consumption of good l for country i and αil is the share parameter for
good l for country i. Yi denotes the inside money for country i; in equilibrium
P2
i=1 yi = 0.
yi > 0 represents the issuance of inside money, i.e., the granting of credit to the other country;
yi < 0 denotes the use of credit which must be replayed from future consumption. Y 0 is a term
which can be interpreted as future endowments of consumption for the country that issues
credit. We assume Y 0 is such that Y 0−y2 is always positive, so that the term is positive in the
utility function. This treatment implicitly assumes that the direction of inter-temporal trade
is given(country 2 is the issuer of credit and country 1 is the purchaser). This allows for this
issuance of inside money by country 2. This treatment is analogous to assuming the direction
of trade in regional trade models, an assumption commonly used in customs union literature
(see Abrego, Riezman and Whalley (2003)).
Thus, for any good l, we can deﬁne the seller’s (net of tariﬀ) price as P0
l and allow each
country i to impose tariﬀs at rate Til on each imported good l (i.e. if Xil ≥ Eil, then Til ≥ 0).
6Tariﬀs are set to zero for any export i (i.e. if Xil ≤ Eil, then Til = 0). Internal (gross of tariﬀ)
prices for good l in country i are thus
Pil = (1 + Til)P0
l , i = 1,2, l = 1,2. (2.10)
These are also sellers prices of good l in country i.
Tariﬀ revenues collected in country i are
Ri =
2 X
l=1
TilP0
l (Xil − Eil)+, i = 1,2 (2.11)
where Eil denotes the initial endowment of good l for country i, and the total income of country
i is given by
Ii =
2 X
l=1
PilEil + Ri, i = 1,2. (2.12)
Budget constraints apply for each country i as
P11X11 + P12X12 + P0Y1 = I1, (2.13)
P21X21 + P22X22 − P0Y2 = I2. (2.14)
We next consider utility maximization subject to a budget constraint for each of the two
countries. Since there are two diﬀerent utility functions and two diﬀerent budget constraints
for the two countries, we have to solve the utility maximization problems country by country.
Country 1 has a standard Cobb-Douglas utility function and a budget constraint, and the utility
maximization problem is as follows.
max U1(X11,X12,Y1) = X
α11
11 X
α12
12 Y
α13
1 (2.15)
s.t. P11X11 + P12X12 + P0Y1 = I1.
Demands for country 1 (including for future consumption) are
X11 =
α11I1
P11
, X12 =
α12I1
P12
, Y1 =
α13I1
P0
. (2.16)
For country 2, the utility function is decreasing in inside money since they are the issuers. This
is captured by using an upper bound Y 0 in the utility function in a term [Y 0 −Y2]. The utility
maximization problem in this case is
max U2(X21,X22,Y2) = X
α21
21 X
α22
22 [Y 0 − Y2]α23 (2.17)
s.t. P21X21 + P22X22 − P0Y2 = I2.
7(2.17) cannot be solved directly, but if use the transformation y2 = Y 0 − Y2, then the budget
constraint is changed to P21X21 + P22X22 − P0[Y 0 − y2] = I2, or
P21X21 + P22X22 + P0y2 = I2 + P0Y 0 ≡ I0
2. (2.18)
Thus (2.17) can be re-written as
max U2(X21,X22,y2) = X
α21
21 X
α22
22 y
α23
2 (2.19)
s.t. P21X21 + P22X22 + P0y2 = I0
2.
Solutions to this problem are
X21 =
α21I0
2
P21
, X22 =
α22I0
2
P22
, y2 =
α23I0
2
P0
(2.20)
and
Y2 = Y 0 − y2 = Y 0 −
α23I0
2
P0
. (2.21)
A general equilibrium for this economy is characterized by a price system (P0
1,P0
2) and
consumption of goods by countries (Xil : i = 1,2;l = 1,2) and inside money held or issued by
countries (Y1,Y2) such that market clearing conditions hold:
2 X
i=1
Xil =
2 X
i=1
Eil for l = 1,2 (2.22)
Y1 = Y2. (2.23)
From the solutions (2.16) and (2.20), general equilibrium conditions in the Cobb-Douglas
case can be stated as
α11I1
P11
+
α21[I2 + P0Y 0]
P21
= E11 + E21 (2.24)
α12I1
P12
+
α22[I2 + P0Y 0]
P22
= E12 + E22 (2.25)
α13I1
P0
= Y 0 −
α23[I2 + P0Y 0]
P0
. (2.26)
If use CES utility functions
U1(X11,X12,Y1) =
￿
α
1
σ1
11 X
σ1−1
σ1
11 + α
1
σ1
12 X
σ1−1
σ1
12 + α
1
σ1
13 Y
σ1−1
σ1
1
￿ σ1
σ1−1
, α11 + α12 + α13 = 1 (2.27)
U2(X21,X22,Y2) =
￿
α
1
σ2
21 X
σ2−1
σ2
21 + α
1
σ2
22 X
σ2−1
σ2
22 + α
1
σ2
23 [Y
0 − Y2]
σ2−1
σ2
￿ σ2
σ2−1
, α21 + α22 + α23 = 1 (2.28)
8the solutions to the utility maximization problems are
X11 =
α11I1
P
σ1
11
hP2
l=1 α1lP
1−σ1
1l + α13P
1−σ1
0
i (2.29)
X12 =
α12I1
P
σ1
12
hP2
l=1 α1lP
1−σ1
1l + α13P
1−σ1
0
i (2.30)
Y1 =
α13I1
P
σ1
0
hP2
l=1 α1lP
1−σ1
1l + α13P
1−σ1
0
i (2.31)
and
X21 =
α21[I2 + P0Y 0]
P
σ2
21
hP2
l=1 α2lP
1−σ2
2l + α23P
1−σ2
0
i (2.32)
X22 =
α22[I2 + P0Y 0]
P
σ2
22
hP2
l=1 α2lP
1−σ2
2l + α23P
1−σ2
0
i (2.33)
y2 =
α23[I2 + P0Y 0]
P
σ2
0
hP2
l=1 α2lP
1−σ2
2l + α23P
1−σ2
0
i. (2.34)
General equilibrium conditions in this case are
α11I1
P
σ1
11
￿P2
l=1 α1lP
1−σ1
1l + α13P
1−σ1
0
￿ +
α21[I2 + P0Y
0]
P
σ2
21
￿P2
l=1 α2lP
1−σ2
2l + α23P
1−σ2
0
￿ = E11 + E21 (2.35)
α12I1
P
σ1
12
￿P2
l=1 α1lP
1−σ1
1l + α13P
1−σ1
0
￿ +
α22[I2 + P0Y
0]
P
σ2
22
￿P2
l=1 α2lP
1−σ2
2l + α23P
1−σ2
0
￿ = E12 + E22 (2.36)
α13I1
P
σ1
0
￿P2
l=1 α1lP
1−σ1
1l + α13P
1−σ1
0
￿ = Y
0 −
α23[I2 + P0Y
0]
P
σ2
0
￿P2
l=1 α2lP
1−σ2
2l + α23P
1−σ2
0
￿. (2.37)
Since we later want to analyze the impacts of adding inside money to model results on
optimal trade policy from a conventional pure Barter model, we also consider a comparable no
inside money model. Without inside money the model above collapses to a standard simple
form. If we use Cobb-Douglas utilities for two countries, then for i = 1,2,
Ui(Xi1,Xi2) = X
αi1
i1 X
αi2
i2 , αi1 + αi2 = 1. (2.38)
The budget constraints for the two countries are, for i = 1,2,
Pi1Xi1 + Pi2Xi2 = Ii (2.39)
and their income for the no inside money case are constructed as
Ii =
2 X
l=1
PilEil + Ri − B0
i , i = 1,2. (2.40)
9where B0
i =
P2
l=1 P0
l Z0
il is trade imbalance from its corresponding case with inside money,
which makes trade with and without insie money be comparable. The utility maximization
problem for each countries is
max Ui(Xi1,Xi2) = X
αi1
i1 X
αi2
i2 (2.41)
s.t. Pi1Xi1 + Pi2Xi2 = Ii
and consumptions are
Xi1 =
αi1Ii
Pi1
Xi2 =
αi2Ii
Pi2
. (2.42)
A general equilibrium for this economy is characterized by a world price system (P0
1,P0
2) and
consumption of goods by countries (Xil : i = 1,2;l = 1,2) such that markets clear
P2
i=1 Xil =
P2
i=1 Eil for l = 1,2.
From (2.42) we can also write general equilibrium conditions as
α11I1
P11
+
α21I2
P21
= E11 + E21 (2.43)
α12I1
P12
+
α22I2
P22
= E12 + E22. (2.44)
If we use CES utility functions Ui(Xi1,Xi2) =

α
1
σi
i1 X
σi−1
σi
i1 + α
1
σi
i2 X
σi−1
σi
i2
 σ1
σi−1
(αi1 + αi2 = 1,
for i = 1,2), then the solution to the utility maximization problem is
Xil =
αilIi
P
σi
il
P2
l0=1 αil0P
1−σi
il0
, i = 1,2 l = 1,2. (2.45)
General equilibrium conditions in this case are
α11I1
P
σ1
11
P2
l=1 α1lP
1−σ1
1l
+
α21I2
P
σ2
21
P2
l=1 α2lP
1−σ2
2l
= E11 + E21 (2.46)
α12I1
P
σ1
12
P2
l=1 α1lP
1−σ1
1l
+
α22I2
P
σ2
22
P2
l=1 α2lP
1−σ2
2l
= E12 + E22. (2.47)
Using these models we can solve the model numerically for Nash equilibria. We assume
as in much trade policy literature that the direction of trade in goods is predetermined and
that country 1 import goods 1 and export goods 2. This direction of trade is also assumed
to be unchanged by tariﬀ interreactions. In computing such equilibria, we also assume that
T12 = T21 = 0, i.e., tariﬀs on exported goods are zero. We deﬁne a Nash equilibrium for this
model as follows. Given T22 ∈ [0,1], we can ﬁnd T11 ∈ [0,1] such that U1 is maximized subject
to general equilibrium conditions. Such a value of T11 ∈ [0,1] changes with T22 ∈ [0,1], and it
yields country 1’s reaction curve. Given T11 ∈ [0,1], we can also ﬁnd T22 ∈ [0,1] such that U2
10is maximized subject to general equilibrium conditions hold. Such a value of T22 ∈ [0,1] also
changes with T11 ∈ [0,1], and it yields country 2’s reaction curve. The intersection of the two
country reaction curves then yields the Nash equilibrium.
The central issue to be addressed by the numerical simulation analysis which follows is how
diﬀerent Nash equilibrium outcomes are between the with and without inside money models
for similar speciﬁcations of preferences and endowments. We use the structures set out above
to shed light on this issue.
113 Numerical Analysis of China - ROW Optimal Trade Policies
3.1 Data and Model Calibration
We have used the structures set out above to numerically investigate optimal trade poli-
cies in a series of model speciﬁcations each involving calibration to a base year data set and
counterfactual analysis. Given the size of the trade imbalances in the Chinese case we use a
two-country (China and ROW) two-good formulation. We use 2005 data and ﬁrst calibrate the
model to observed trade ﬂows and trade imbalances for China. The numerical investigation
we report involves computing both own country optimal policy assuming no retaliation from
trading partners, as well as cases where retaliatory interplay between countries occurs yielding
a Nash equilibrium. We compare outcomes between similar structures with and without the
added element of inside money to assess the impact on optimal trade policies of adding monetary
structure. We employ GAMS solution software in computing alternative model solutions.
In model calibration we draw on 2005 data from the UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics
(2007). In order to use the 2-goods model speciﬁcation, we divide the value of trade and output
in this data into aggregate non-manufacturing and manufacturing sectors for both China and
ROW. UNCTAD data on foreign trade report of export and import of primary commodities
(including fuels, SITC 0 to 4 plus 68), manufactured goods (SITC 5 to 8 less 68), and services
by country. For model 2005 output data we deﬁne “agriculture, hunting, forestry, ﬁshing,
mining, and utilities” as non-manufacturing from this source, and take “manufacturing and
construction” as manufacturing. “Services output” is divided between non-manufacturing and
manufacturing sectors with the proportion weighted by sectoral output. We divide import values
of service into imports of non-manufactured (primary) and manufactured goods weighted by
the import volume of these two sectors. A similar division is made for export values of services.
In using this data in model calibration, we use the benchmark data in value terms and de-
compose it into price and quantity observations. We deﬁne physical units of non-manufacturing
and manufacturing products as related to value observations in data following the Harberger-
Shoven-Whalley units convention that, in the initial benchmark equilibrium data, Buyers prices
are gross of country tariﬀs occurring in base year, Sellers prices are unity, ie PN = PM = 1.
In the UNCTAD data, the gross output of the Chinese non-manufacturing sector is USD
468.101 billion, compared to an output of USD 11507.699 billion for the ROW. 2005 Manu-
facturing output of China is USD 1766.189 billion, or 6.0 % of that for ROW, whose 2005
manufacturing output is 29240.343 USD billion. For China, the values of net trade (imports)
12in the non-manufacturing and manufacturing sectors, are 119.943 and -212.955 USD billion,
respectively. China is a net importer of non-manufactured goods, and a net exporter of manu-
factured goods, and in the model data runs a trade surplus of US$ 93 billion in 2005. The values
of sectoral consumption are computed as sectoral output plus the same sectoral net trade.
We use 2005 tariﬀ rates on primary and manufactured goods used by China and ROW
from the World Bank (World Development Indicators, 2007) in the benchmark data. 2005
tariﬀ rates are collected from the World Development Indicators (WDI, 2007), and are value
weighted by imports. These are diﬀerent from the simple mean tariﬀs reported by 2007 World
Development Indicators. In calibration we assume both countries impose no tariﬀs or export
subsidies on its exports. In the 2005 data, the value weighted tariﬀ rate of China on primary
goods imports is 3.4%, and the value weighted tariﬀ in ROW on imports (manufactured goods)
is 3.2%. These diﬀerent tariﬀ rates yield diﬀerent relative domestic prices in China and ROW.
The total income for each conterpart is computed as its value of output plus the tariﬀ revenue.
For China, its 2005 income, IC, is US$ billion 2238.368, which is small relative to that of ROW,
whose total income, IR, is US$ billion 40754.857.
These data are reported in Table 1 where the model benchmark equilibrium data are shown.
The UNCTAD data uses market exchange rates which tend to underestimate real economic
activity in China relative to purchasing power parity rates (PPPs). The 2005 International
Comparison Program (ICP) of World Bank (2008) employs PPPs measures, and when used
yields a diﬀerent picture. Using 2005 ICP data based on the PPP measure, China’s GDP is
US$ 5333.2 billion, and the GDP for ROW is US$ 49642.5 billion. Using the PPP measure
China’s share of global GDP is 9.7%, compared to 5.2% using market exchange rates. Since
changes in the relative size of China compared to ROW yield diﬀerent numerical results from
the model, we also calibrate the model to 2005 China and ROW data using PPP data. These
are also shown in Table 1.
We can also divide the PPP measured GDP of China and ROW into non-munufacturing
and manufacturing sectoral output using the proportion of sectoral output as in the UNCTAD
data. The sectoral trade data and tariﬀ rates are the same as the market exchange rate case.
In the PPP case, China has output of US$ 1117.347 billion in the non-manufacturing sector,
relative to non-manufacturing output of US$ 14019.953 billion for ROW. China now accounts
for an increased share of global output under the PPP measure, especially in its manufacturing
output. In 2005 China produced US$ 4215.853 billion of manufacturing output, 12.2% of that
for ROW, whose manufacturing output are US$ 35622.907 billion.
13As ROW runs a trade deﬁcit and issues inside money in the data, we set their future en-
dowment Y 0 as (arbitrarily large) to US$ 1000 billion in calibration. Using 2005 benchmark
data from Table 1, we calibrate the share parameters for Cobb-Douglas utility functions for
China and ROW. These are reported in Table 2 both for formulations incorporating and ex-
cluding inside money. This allows us to assess the added eﬀects of inside money on Nash
outcomes. For the case including inside money, China’s share parameters in its utility function
for non-manufacturing (αN) and manufacturing goods (αM) are 0.265 and 0.694, respectively.
In the PPP case, China’s share parameters for non-manufacturing (αN) and manufacturing
goods (αM) are 0.233 and 0.750 respectively. In both two cases, China’s share parameters for
non-manufacturing goods are lower than those of ROW, which implies that China relatively
prefers consumption of manufacturing goods.
14Table 1. Base Case Equilibria Used For Calibration of With Inside
Money Models (2005 data in Billion)
Value
Case Based on Market Exchange Rates Case Based on Purchasing Power Parity
China ROW China ROW
Consumption
XN = 572.653 XN = 11387.756 XN = 1200.550 XN = 13899.649
XM = 1553.234 XM = 28546.621 XM = 4002.898 XM = 34731.276
Endowments
EN = 452.709 EN = 11507.699 EN = 1080.607 EN = 14019.593
EM = 1766.189 EM = 28333.666 EM = 4215.853 EM = 34518.321
Tariﬀ Rates
TN = 0.034 TN = 0.033 TN = 0.034 TN = 0.033
TM = 0.053 TM = 0.032 TN = 0.053 TN = 0.032
Imports
iN = 185.790 iN = 65.847 iN = 185.790 iN = 65.847
iM = 555.950 iM = 768.905 iM = 555.950 iM = 768.905
Exports
eN = 65.847 eN = 185.790 eN = 65.847 eN = 185.790
eM = 768.905 eM = 555.950 eM = 768.905 eM = 555.950
Trade Imbalance BC = 93.011 BR = −93.011 BC = 93.011 BR = −93.011
Income IC = 2238.368 IR = 40754.857 IC = 5337.278 IR = 49649.315
1. Endowment (Output) and Net Trade data are from Handbook of Statistics(Tables 3.1, 5.2 and 8.3,
UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2007).
2. “N” denotes Non-Manufacturing section, which include Agriculture, Mining, and Utilities sectors. “M”
denotes Manufacturing section which include manufacturing and construction sectors.
3. Tariﬀs are value weighted and from World Development Indicators (Table 6.7, Tariﬀ Barriers. World
Development Indicators 2007).
4. GDP based on PPP measure is from the World Bank (2005 ICP Global Results: Summary Table, page:
23-27, 2005 International Comparison Program).
Table 2. Calibrated Share Parameters — Cobb Douglas Case
Share Parameters
With Inside Money Without Inside Money
China ROW China ROW
CD case based on market exchange rate
Non-Manufacturing αN = 0.264533 αN = 0.272729 αN = 0.276002 αN = 0.278785
Manufacturing αM = 0.693914 αM = 0.705549 αM = 0.723998 αM = 0.721215
Inside Money αI = 0.041553 αI = 0.021722
CD case based on purchasing power parity
Non-Manufacturing αN = 0.232585 αN = 0.274429 αN = 0.236710 αN = 0.279433
Manufacturing αM = 0.749989 αM = 0.707664 αM = 0.763290 αM = 0.720567
Inside Money αI = 0.017427 αI = 0.017907
153.2 Model Results
Using the calibrated model parameters from Table 2, we have conducted several counterfactural
numerical analyses using the China-ROW trade model. Table 3 presents model results under
various trade policy scenarios for China and ROW. Table 3.1 reports model results for UNCTAD
case with inside money, and Table 3.2 for the parallel trade structure excluding inside money.
The model results using PPP data with inside money are given in Table 3.3. Table 3.4 reports
model PPP results excluding inside money.
The 1st column of Table 3.1 is the 2005 benchmark equilibrium. The result of changing
one country’s tariﬀ rate assuming no response from the other are reported in Columns 2 and
3 of Table 3.1. In the 2nd column, when China’s tariﬀ rate increases from 0.034 to 0.050, the
world price for China’s exports (manufactured goods) relatively rises, and China’s income (IC)
increases from 2238.368 to US$ 2246.491 billion. However, utility does not increase for China,
and is slightly reduced to 1061.107 from 1061.196. In the 3rd column ROW increases its tariﬀs
on imports from the benchmark level of 0.032 to 0.050. Its income also increases but unlike
China in Column 2, ROW increases its utility by raising tariﬀs on imports. The utility of ROW
increases from 20614.170 in the benchmark case to 20615.730. This is because ROW is much
larger than China in the data and can improve its terms of trade. Thus, if a large country
increases tariﬀ rate on its imports, it can reduce its imports and simultaneously lower the world
price of imports.
Given tariﬀ rates in one country, we can thus ﬁnd the optimal tariﬀ rate for the other
country. Optimal tariﬀs for ROW and China respectively are reported in the 4th and 5th
column assuming no response from the other country. In the 4th column, the optimal tariﬀ for
ROW, TR, is 0.3173 when the tariﬀ of China (TC) remains at 0.0340. Its utility is increased
to 20625.570. In the 5th column, conversely, keeping the tariﬀ of ROW at current levels, we
ﬁnd the optimal rate of China is 0.0131, which is smaller than its applied tariﬀ in 2005. Its
utility is slightly increased to 1061.239. These results suggest that, compared to the benchmark
case, China would beneﬁt from a small reduction in tariﬀs on its imports of non-manufactured
goods, and the ROW can gain welfare by increasing its import tariﬀs on manufactured goods.
The last column of Table 3.1 reports the Nash equilibrium of the tariﬀ game between China
and ROW. In the Nash equilibrium, the Nash tariﬀs for China and ROW are TC = 0.0027 and
TR = 0.3346 respectively, and the amount of inside money is 76.959. This implies that China
should lower its tariﬀ on non-manufacturing imports, and ROW raise its tariﬀs on imports
from China in a Nash equilibrium. In such an equilibrium the trade deﬁcit of ROW and trade
16surplus of China falls.
Comparable analyses using a model structure excluding the added eﬀects of inside money are
reported in Table 3.2. The 1st column reports the benchmark equilibrium for the case without
inside money, which diﬀers from that in Table 3.1 in income and utility, because incomes are
adjusted by initial trade imbalances. Calibration of the no inside money is to this base case
data. In the 2nd and 3rd columns, we report results for changes in tariﬀs of China or ROW
alone as in Table 3.1.
To assess the eﬀects of inside money on optimal tariﬀ policy, we compare the optimal tariﬀs
for China and ROW given tariﬀs of the other country are ﬁxed at 2005 level. When China’s
tariﬀ rate ﬁxed at 0.0340, the 4th column shows that ROW’s optimal tariﬀ is 0.0155, which
is lower than that in the case including inside money. The 5th column reports an optimal
tariﬀ for China of 0.0016 compared to the optimal tariﬀ rate of 0.0131 in Table 3.1. The Nash
equilibrium for a trade structure excluding inside money is reported in the last column. The
Nash tariﬀs for China and ROW are TC = 0.0016 and TR = 0.0313, respectively. The country
Nash tariﬀ rates are closer compared to the case with inside money. A comparison of outcomes
beween Tables 3.1 and 3.2 thus suggests that in terms of retaliating power, acknowledging the
role of inside money may beneﬁt countries with a trade deﬁcit, while the country who runs a
trade surplus suﬀers.
Table 3.3 reports model results using PPP data with inside money. The 1st column reports
the 2005 benchmark equilibrium for the PPP base case. The 2nd and 3rd columns report
equilibrium when China and ROW slightly increase its 2005 tariﬀ rates to 0.05 in turn. In the
2nd column, the world price of manufactured goods remains the same, but the price of non-
manufactured goods is reduced to 0.9987. The larger asymetric eﬀects on world prices for these
2 goods from the increased tariﬀ of China reveals that, with the much larger size of economy,
China’s retaliatory tariﬀ power increases. If China’s tariﬀ rate increases from 0.034 to 0.050,
the income of China increases from 5337.278 to 5354.553, but its utility decreases to 2832.890
from 2833.098, and the utility and income of ROW are both reduced. Conversely, when the
tariﬀ of the ROW increases to 0.05, its utility and income increases while China experiences
an income and welfare loss. Unlike the results in Table 3.1, the eﬀects on world price of an
increase in the tariﬀ of the ROW are less. This reﬂects the feature that the retaliatory tariﬀ
power of the ROW has declined.
Optimal tariﬀ policies for China and ROW are reported in the 4th and 5th columns of Table
3.3, respectively. Given the tariﬀ of China at 0.0340, the ﬁrst step optimal tariﬀ of ROW is
170.1450, which is sharply reduced compared to 0.3174 in Table 3.1. In 5th column, the optimal
tariﬀ of China is 0.0140 when the tariﬀ of the ROW is 0.0320, which shows a slight increase from
0.0131 in Table 3.1. In the Nash equilibrium, the Nash tariﬀs for China and ROW respectively
are 0.0052 and 0.1595 and the gap in optimal tariﬀs between the 2 countries is narrowed. A
comparison of the results in Tables 3.3 and 3.1 suggests that, as a result of much larger size,
China has more retaliatory power using the PPPs data relative to the market exchange rate
data.
Table 3.4 reports equilibrium outcomes for the PPP case excluding the eﬀects of inside
money. The 1st column gives the benchmark equilibrium. In the 2nd column, when the tariﬀ of
China unilaterally increases to 0.050, China’s income also increases but not its utility, and the
income and utility of ROW both decrease slightly, similar to the results in Tables 3.1, 3.2 and
3.3. The 3rd column reports equilibrium outcomes when the tariﬀ of the ROW increases, and
results here yield the same conclusion as Table 3.1. We investigate optimal tariﬀs for China
and ROW in 4th and 5th column. When China’s tariﬀ rate ﬁxed at 0.0340, ROW’s optimal
tariﬀ is 0.0152, which is lower than that in Table 3.3, and the world price for manufactured
goods PM here is 1.0075, relative to the price of non-manufactured goods PN = 0.9925. The
diﬀerence in prices between non-manufactured and manufactured goods decreases compared to
the case reported in the Column 4 of Table 3.2. The 5th column reports an optimal tariﬀ for
China of 0.0026, compared to the optimal tariﬀ rate of 0.0140 in Table 3.3.
The last column reports the Nash equilibrium outcome. The Nash tariﬀs for China and
ROW are TC = 0.0028 and TR = 0.0301, respectively. The gap in Nash tariﬀs between the two
countries is reduced compared to the case with inside money, and the tariﬀ of ROW is reduced
relative to China’s, illustrating that inside money helps countries with trade deﬁcits to gain
improved retaliatory power.
In brief, the results for both market exchange rate and PPP cases indicates that inside
money can exert signiﬁcant inﬂuence on retaliatory power. Speciﬁcally, the large economies
with trade deﬁcits gain improved retaliatory power in a tariﬀ war.
18Table 3. Equilibria in Trade between China
and the ROW with and without Inside Money
3.1 Equilibrium with Inside Money (Market Exchange Rate Data)
Equilibrium Equilibrium Optimal Tariﬀ Optimal Tariﬀ
Benchmark with 5% with 5% Rate Given Rate Given Nash
Equilibrium Tariﬀ from Tariﬀ from Tariﬀ from Tariﬀ from Equilibrium
China ROW China ROW
Tariﬀ Rate TC = 0.0340 TC = 0.0500 TC = 0.0340 TC = 0.0340 TC = 0.0131 TC = 0.0027
TR = 0.0320 TR = 0.0320 TR = 0.0500 TR = 0.3173 TR = 0.0320 TR = 0.3346
Price PN = 1.0000 PN = 0.9991 PN = 1.0006 PN = 1.0079 PN = 1.0012 PN = 1.0098
PM = 1.0000 PM = 0.9998 PM = 0.9843 PM = 0.7985 PM = 1.0002 PM = 0.7890
P0 = 1 P0 = 1 P0 = 1 P0 = 1 P0 = 1 P0 = 1
Consumption XCN = 572.653 XCN = 566.490 XCN = 565.214 XCN = 477.960 XCN = 580.916 XCN = 483.861
XCM = 1553.234 XCM = 1559.129 XCM = 1558.492 XCM = 1636.330 XCM = 1545.317 XCM = 1628.785
XRN = 11387.760 XRN = 11393.920 XRN = 11395.190 XRN = 11482.450 XRN = 11379.490 XRN = 11476.550
XRM = 28546.620 XRM = 28540.730 XRM = 28541.360 XRM = 28463.530 XRM = 28554.540 XRM = 28471.070
Y = 93.011 Y = 93.349 Y = 91.859 Y = 78.244 Y = 92.558 Y = 76.959
Income IC = 2238.368 IC = 2246.491 IC = 2210.653 IC = 1882.996 IC = 2227.454 IC = 1852.068
IR = 40754.860 IR = 40739.320 IR = 40807.880 IR = 41434.670 IR = 40775.740 IR = 41493.840
Utility UC = 1061.196 UC = 1061.107 UC = 1059.466 UC = 1041.396 UC = 1061.239 UC = 1040.720
UR = 20614.170 UR = 20614.040 UR = 20615.730 UR = 20625.570 UR = 20614.350 UR = 20627.160
3.2 Equilibrium without Inside Money (Market Exchange Rate Data)
Equilibrium Equilibrium Optimal tariﬀ Optimal Tariﬀ
Benchmark with 5 % with 5 % Rate Given Rate Given Nash
Equilibrium Tariﬀ from Tariﬀ from tariﬀ from Tariﬀ from Equilibrium
China ROW China ROW
Tariﬀ Rate TC = 0.0340 TC = 0.0500 TC = 0.0340 TC = 0.0340 TC = 0.0016 TC = 0.0016
TR = 0.0320 TR = 0.0320 TR = 0.0500 TR = 0.0155 TR = 0.0320 TR = 0.0313
World Price PN = 1.0000 PN = 0.9996 PN = 1.0082 PN = 0.9923 PN = 1.0008 PN = 1.0005
PM = 1.0000 PM = 1.0004 PM = 0.9918 PM = 1.0077 PM = 0.9992 PM = 0.9995
Consumption XCN = 572.653 XCN = 566.561 XCN = 565.827 XCN = 579.126 XCN = 585.412 XCN = 585.676
XCM = 1553.234 XCM = 1559.322 XCM = 1560.173 XCM = 1546.859 XCM = 1540.455 XCM = 1540.199
XRN = 11387.760 XRN = 11393.850 XRN = 11394.580 XRN = 11381.280 XRN = 11375.000 XRN = 11374.730
XRM = 28546.620 XRM = 28540.530 XRM = 28539.680 XRM = 28553.000 XRM = 28559.400 XRM = 28559.660
Income IC = 2145.357 IC = 2154.569 IC = 2137.218 IC = 2152.953 IC = 2126.037 IC = 2126.372
IR = 40847.870 IR = 40854.400 IR = 41208.500 IR = 40511.260 IR = 40834.100 IR = 40819.970
Utility UC = 1179.323 UC = 1179.181 UC = 1179.226 UC = 1179.470 UC = 1179.441 UC = 1179.446
UR = 22094.650 UR = 22094.550 UR = 22094.470 UR = 22094.710 UR = 22094.880 UR = 22094.880
193.3 Equilibrium with Inside Money (Purchasing Power Parity Data)
Equilibrium Equilibrium Optimal Tariﬀ Optimal Tariﬀ
Benchmark with 5% with 5% Rate Given Rate Given Nash
Equilibrium Tariﬀ from Tariﬀ from Tariﬀ from Tariﬀ from Equilibrium
China ROW China ROW
Tariﬀ Rate TC = 0.0340 TC = 0.0500 TC = 0.0340 TC = 0.0340 TC = 0.0140 TC = 0.0052
TR = 0.0320 TR = 0.0320 TR = 0.0500 TR = 0.1450 TR = 0.0320 TR = 0.1595
Price PN = 1.0000 PN = 0.9987 PN = 1.0002 PN = 1.0011 PN = 1.0016 PN = 1.0034
PM = 1.0000 PM = 1.0000 PM = 0.9845 PM = 0.9100 PM = 1.0000 PM = 0.8996
P0 = 1 P0 = 1 P0 = 1 P0 = 1 P0 = 1 P0 = 1
Consumption XCN = 1200.550 XCN = 1187.583 XCN = 1185.536 XCN = 1113.666 XCN = 1217.162 XCN = 1125.974
XCM = 4002.898 XCM = 4015.706 XCM = 4015.934 XCM = 4084.578 XCM = 3986.440 XCM = 4070.666
XRN = 13899.650 XRN = 13912.620 XRN = 13914.660 XRN = 13986.530 XRN = 13883.040 XRN = 13974.230
XRM = 34731.280 XRM = 34718.470 XRM = 34718.240 XRM = 34649.600 XRM = 34747.730 XRM = 34663.510
Y = 93.011 Y = 93.312 Y = 91.865 Y = 86.372 Y = 92.624 Y = 85.087
Income IC = 5337.278 IC = 5354.553 IC = 5271.497 IC = 4956.280 IC = 5315.082 IC = 4882.580
IR = 49649.310 IR = 49632.500 IR = 49713.330 IR = 50020.090 IR = 49670.910 IR = 50091.810
Utility UC = 2833.098 UC = 2832.890 UC = 2831.103 UC = 2822.880 UC = 2833.194 UC = 2822.136
UR = 25306.170 UR = 25305.890 UR = 25307.510 UR = 25310.580 UR = 25306.540 UR = 25312.290
3.4 Equilibrium without Inside Money (Purchasing Power Parity Data)
Equilibrium Equilibrium Optimal tariﬀ Optimal Tariﬀ
Benchmark with 5 % with 5 % Rate Given Rate Given Nash
Equilibrium Tariﬀ from Tariﬀ from tariﬀ from Tariﬀ from Equilibrium
China ROW China ROW
Tariﬀ Rate TC = 0.0340 TC = 0.0500 TC = 0.0340 TC = 0.0340 TC = 0.0026 TC = 0.0028
TR = 0.0320 TR = 0.0320 TR = 0.0500 TR = 0.0152 TR = 0.0320 TR = 0.0301
World Price PN = 1.0000 PN = 0.9993 PN = 1.0079 PN = 0.9925 PN = 1.0013 PN = 1.0005
PM = 1.0000 PM = 1.0007 PM = 0.9921 PM = 1.0075 PM = 0.9987 PM = 0.9995
Consumption XCN = 1200.550 XCN = 1187.616 XCN = 1186.050 XCN = 1214.552 XCN = 1226.732 XCN = 1228.188
XCM = 4002.898 XCM = 4015.815 XCM = 4017.629 XCM = 3989.105 XCM = 3976.647 XCM = 3975.234
XRN = 13899.650 XRN = 13912.580 XRN = 13914.150 XRN = 13885.650 XRN = 13873.470 XRN = 13872.010
XRM = 34731.280 XRM = 34718.360 XRM = 34716.540 XRM = 34745.070 XRM = 34757.530 XRM = 34758.940
Income IC = 5244.267 IC = 5264.613 IC = 5221.920 IC = 5265.515 IC = 5202.996 IC = 5205.566
IR = 49742.330 IR = 49756.180 IR = 50188.200 IR = 49318.370 IR = 49714.190 IR = 49666.850
Utility UC = 3010.071 UC = 3009.755 UC = 3009.853 UC = 3010.402 UC = 3010.325 UC = 3010.354
UR = 26889.670 UR = 26889.450 UR = 26889.290 UR = 26889.790 UR = 26890.140 UR = 26890.140
20We also present results which show the impacts of model behavior of using CES rather than
CD preferences in Table 4. The 1st and 2nd columns report the Nash tariﬀs for the market
exchange rate case with and without inside money. The 3rd and 4th columns report Nash
tariﬀs for the PPP case with and without the added eﬀects of inside money. The Cobb-Douglas
case reported in Table 3 is presented here to allow comparison to results from CES cases. The
2nd to the 5th rows report the Nash equilibrium outcome from CES formulations with diﬀerent
elasticities of substitution of (σC = 0.80; σR = 1.25), (σC = 1.25; σR = 0.80), (σC = 0.80;
σR = 0.80) and (σC = 1.25; σR = 1.25) respectively. The 6th to 9th rows present the Nash
equilibrium in CES cases with elasticities of substitution of (σC = 0.50; σR = 2.00), (σC = 2.00;
σR = 0.50), (σC = 0.50; σR = 0.50) and (σC = 2.00; σR = 2.00), respectively. In these CES
formulations, Nash tariﬀs change with the elasticities of substitution, since preferences also have
an impact on tariﬀ outcomes.
We ﬁrst examine Nash tariﬀs across the ﬁrst 4 CES preference cases for the market exchange
rate case with inside money. The ratio of Nash tariﬀs for ROW to China is the largest with
elasticities of substitution of (σC = 0.80; σR = 1.25), and the Nash tariﬀs are 0.0016 and 0.4279
respectively for China and ROW. The ratio of Nash tariﬀs is the smallest with elasticities of
substitution of (σC = 1.25; σR = 0.80), and Nash tariﬀs for China and ROW are TC = 0.0043
and TR = 0.2666 respectively. Compared to the ﬁrst 4 CES cases, the last 4 CES cases have
more extremely elasticities of substitution. In these cases, the ratio of the Nash tariﬀ for ROW
to China is the largest in case with elasticities of substitution of (σC = 0.50; σR = 2.00), and
Nash tariﬀs for China and ROW are 0.0003 and 0.7633 respectively. In the 6th row, China’s
preference is relatively less ﬂexible compared to the case reported in the 2nd row. The opposite
is the case with elasticities of substitution of (σC = 2.00; σR = 0.50), where the Nash tariﬀs
of China and ROW are 0.0113 and 0.1762, respectively. Compared to results reported in the
3rd row of the preference of China become more ﬂexible relative to ROW, China has improved
retaliatory power compared to ROW in a tariﬀ war.
The Nash tariﬀ results in these CES cases suggest that more rigid consumer preferences
result in lower retaliatory power, and ﬂexible preferences yield economies relatively larger ne-
gotiating power. The intuition is that one country can make advantage of the much rigid
preferences of its counterpart to exploit welfare gains.
Table 5 reports comparisons of impacts on trade volumes and imbalances between Nash
equilibria, the benchmark equilibrium and a no tariﬀ equilibrium in CD cases with and without
inside money. The ﬁrst subtabulation reports the value of net imports by country, and the
21second reports the size of trade imbalances (or inside money) in these 3 equilibrium. In free
trade with inside money, China’s net imports are US$ 147.800 billion, compared to US$ 242.193
billion for ROW, and their trade imbalance is US$ 94.393 billion. In the Nash equilibrium with
inside money, net imports of China and ROW are reduced to US$ 31.457 billion and 76.959
billion respectively. The amount of inside money in Nash equilibrium falls to US$ 76.959 billion.
In the CD formulation without inside money, both countries have balanced trade, and their net
trade is oﬀset by the initial trade imbalance in the base case data. In the free trade equilibrium,
the amount of net trade of China is US$ 144.267 billion, and ROW’s is US$ 241.988 billion. In
the benchmark equilibrium, the net imports of China and ROW are US$ 119.943 billion and
212.954 billion, respectively. In the Nash equilibrium, countries trade decreases relative to the
base case, and their net imports are iC = 133.028 and iR = 225.890. The trade data across
alternative cases implies that the benchmark equilibrium is far from the Nash equilibrium case,
while the free trade equilibrium case is closer to it.
Finally we investigate the inﬂuence of the size of future endowments on Nash equilibrium
outcomes. As presented in Table 6, we can examine the eﬀects on Nash tariﬀs, world prices,
utilities, and the amount of inside money of changing Y 0 from 700 to 5000 with a step size of
100. Results show that as the future endowment of the ROW increases, the Nash tariﬀs of both
sides increase slightly, together with the downward prices, utilities and the amount of inside
money.
22Table 4. Sensitivity of Nash Equilibrium Tariﬀs to Elasticities of Substitution
Cases Based on Cases Based on
Market Exchange Rates Purchasing Power Parity Rates
Nash Tariﬀs Nash Tariﬀs Nash Tariﬀs Nash Tariﬀs
With Without With Without
Inside Money Inside Money Inside Money Inside Money
1. Cobb-Douglas case
China TC = 0.0027 TC = 0.0016 TC = 0.0052 TC = 0.0028
ROW TR = 0.3346 TR = 0.0313 TR = 0.1595 TR = 0.0301
2. CES case with elasticities of substitution (σC = 0.80; σR = 1.25)
China TC = 0.0016 TC = 0.0011 TC = 0.0037 TC = 0.0019
ROW TR = 0.4279 TR = 0.0330 TR = 0.1957 TR = 0.0321
3. CES case with elasticities of substitution (σC = 1.25; σR = 0.80)
China TC = 0.0043 TC = 0.0025 TC = 0.0075 TC = 0.0042
ROW TR = 0.2666 TR = 0.0310 TR = 0.1325 TR = 0.0292
4. CES case with elasticities of substitution (σC = 0.80; σR = 0.80)
China TC = 0.0030 TC = 0.0020 TC = 0.0064 TC = 0.0035
ROW TR = 0.4388 TR = 0.0394 TR = 0.2044 TR = 0.0378
5. CES case with elasticities of substitution (σC = 1.25; σR = 1.25)
China TC = 0.0023 TC = 0.0013 TC = 0.0042 TC = 0.0022
ROW TR = 0.2577 TR = 0.0250 TR = 0.1251 TR = 0.0240
6. CES case with elasticities of substitution (σC = 0.50; σR = 2.00)
China TC = 0.0003 TC = 0.0005 TC = 0.0019 TC = 0.0009
ROW TR = 0.7633 TR = 0.0417 TR = 0.3184 TR = 0.0413
7. CES case with elasticities of substitution (σC = 2.00; σR = 0.50)
China TC = 0.0113 TC = 0.0069 TC = 0.0171 TC = 0.0110
ROW TR = 0.1762 TR = 0.0334 TR = 0.0954 TR = 0.0292
8. CES case with elasticities of substitution (σC = 0.50; σR = 0.50)
China TC = 0.0028 TC = 0.0032 TC = 0.0097 TC = 0.0056
ROW TR = 0.8121 TR = 0.0639 TR = 0.3526 TR = 0.0614
9. CES case with elasticities of substitution (σC = 2.00; σR = 2.00)
China TC = 0.0016 TC = 0.0008 TC = 0.0027 TC = 0.0014
ROW TR = 0.1522 TR = 0.0155 TR = 0.0759 TR = 0.0149
23Table 5. Comparisons of Trade Volumes and Trade Imbalances between Nash
Equilibria, Base Case and Free Trade for Cobb-Douglas Case
With Inside Without Inside
Money Money
Impacts on Trade Volumes (at constant base case prices)
China’s Imports
Nash Equilibrium iC = 31.457494 iC = 133.027563
Base Case iC = 119.943451 iC = 119.943451
Free Trade iC = 147.800109 iC = 144.267297
ROW’s Imports
Nash Equilibrium iR = 108.416846 iR = 225.889704
Base Case iR = 212.954663 iR = 212.953912
Free Trade iR = 242.192954 iR = 241.987682
Impacts on Trade Imbalances (in billion USD)
China’s Trade Surplus
Nash Equilibrium BC = 76.959162 BC = 0
Base Case BC = 93.011138 BC = 0
Free Trade BC = 94.393381 BC = 0
ROW’s Trade Deﬁcit
Nash Equilibrium BR = −76.959162 BR = 0
Base Case BR = −93.011138 BR = 0
Free Trade BR = −94.393381 BR = 0
24Table 6. Sensitivity of Nash Equilibrium to Y 0
Future Endowments (Y 0) Nash Tariﬀs World Price Utility Inside Money
700
TC = 0.0008 PN = 1.0176 UC = 1041.144 Y = 77.599
TR = 0.3324 PM = 0.7963 UR = 20974.910
800
TC = 0.0016 PN = 1.0143 UC = 1040.967 Y = 77.331
TR = 0.3333 PM = 0.7933 UR = 20850.970
900
TC = 0.0022 PN = 1.0118 UC = 1040.830 Y = 77.124
TR = 0.3340 PM = 0.7909 UR = 20735.410
1000
TC = 0.0027 PN = 1.0098 UC = 1040.720 Y = 76.959
TR = 0.3346 PM = 0.7890 UR = 20627.160
1100
TC = 0.0031 PN = 1.0082 UC = 1040.630 Y = 76.824
TR = 0.3351 PM = 0.7875 UR = 20525.390
1200
TC = 0.0034 PN = 1.0068 UC = 1040.555 Y = 76.711
TR = 0.3355 PM = 0.7862 UR = 20429.440
1300
TC = 0.0037 PN = 1.0057 UC = 1040.492 Y = 76.617
TR = 0.3358 PM = 0.7852 UR = 20338.760
1400
TC = 0.0039 PN = 1.0047 UC = 1040.438 Y = 76.536
TR = 0.3361 PM = 0.7843 UR = 20252.890
1500
TC = 0.0041 PN = 1.0039 UC = 1040.391 Y = 76.465
TR = 0.3363 PM = 0.7835 UR = 20171.440
1600
TC = 0.0043 PN = 1.0031 UC = 1040.350 Y = 76.404
TR = 0.3365 PM = 0.7828 UR = 20094.070
1700
TC = 0.0044 PN = 1.0025 UC = 1040.314 Y = 76.350
TR = 0.3367 PM = 0.7822 UR = 20020.490
1800
TC = 0.0046 PN = 1.0019 UC = 1040.282 Y = 76.302
TR = 0.3369 PM = 0.7816 UR = 19950.440
1900
TC = 0.0047 PN = 1.0013 UC = 1040.253 Y = 76.259
TR = 0.3370 PM = 0.7811 UR = 19883.700
2000
TC = 0.0048 PN = 1.0009 UC = 1040.227 Y = 76.220
TR = 0.3372 PM = 0.7807 UR = 19820.050
2500
TC = 0.0053 PN = 0.9991 UC = 1040.129 Y = 76.073
TR = 0.3377 PM = 0.7790 UR = 19542.490
3000
TC = 0.0055 PN = 0.9979 UC = 1040.063 Y = 75.976
TR = 0.3380 PM = 0.7779 UR = 19321.160
3500
TC = 0.0057 PN = 0.9971 UC = 1040.017 Y = 75.907
TR = 0.3382 PM = 0.7772 UR = 19144.600
4000
TC = 0.0059 PN = 0.9964 UC = 1039.982 Y = 75.855
TR = 0.3384 PM = 0.7766 UR = 19004.790
4500
TC = 0.0060 PN = 0.9959 UC = 1039.954 Y = 75.814
TR = 0.3386 PM = 0.7761 UR = 18895.820
5000
TC = 0.0061 PN = 0.9956 UC = 1039.933 Y = 75.782
TR = 0.3387 PM = 0.7757 UR = 18813.200
25Finally, we provide graphic reportage of results. Figure 1 shows the reaction functions in
tariﬀ rates for both China and ROW in cases incorporating and excluding inside money in
CD preferences. The intersection of these two reaction functions yields the Nash equilibrium
tariﬀs. Figure 1.1 shows the Nash tariﬀ rates for the CD preference case incorporating inside
money. Nash tariﬀs for China and ROW are T1 = 0.0027, T2 = 0.3346, respectively. Figure
1.2 shows Nash tariﬀs for the CD case excluding inside money. The Nash tariﬀs for China and
ROW are T1 = 0.0016 and T2 = 0.0313 respectively. Thus, as we emphasize above, tariﬀ games
incorporating inside money can yield large diﬀerences in Nash equilibrium results. Inside money
helps countries who run a trade deﬁcit increase the Nash tariﬀs, and lower the retaliatory power
of countries who run a trade surplus.
We present Nash tariﬀs and reaction functions of tariﬀs for CES and CD preferences incor-
porating inside money in Figure 2. A noteworthy feature of Figure 2 is that Nash tariﬀs for the
4 CES cases are scattered around the Nash tariﬀs implied by CD preferences. The gap between
China and ROW tariﬀs is largest when the substitution elasticities for China and ROW are
σC = 0.80 and σR = 0.80. The gap is narrowed when the substitution elasticities for China and
ROW are σC = 1.25 and σR = 0.80. The Nash tariﬀs in CD case are at the center of results
for the 4 CES cases. Figure 3 displays the Nash equilibrium tariﬀs under both CES and CD
preferences excluding inside money. Compared to Nash tariﬀs incorporating inside money, the
gap in tariﬀs between China and ROW is smaller.
26Figure 1. Reaction Functions of Tariﬀ Rates for China and
ROW for CD Preferences
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27Figure 2. Nash Equilibria and Reaction Functions for China and ROW
for CD and CES Preferences Incorporating Inside Money
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Figure 3. Nash Equilibria and Reaction Functions for China and ROW
for CD and CES Preferences Excluding Inside Money
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284 Conclusions and Remarks
This paper discusses optimal trade policy and Nash outcomes across countries when inside
money is present in a monetary-trade model. Countries with trade deﬁcits have enhanced
retaliating power compared to a no inside money model, and countries with trade surpluses have
lowered retaliating power. We use a conventional goods trade model to numerically explore Nash
equilibria, but do so in a structure where, with inside money, trade imbalances are endogenously
determined. We present numerical simulation results which show that Nash equilibria for the
two cases for similarly calibrated model parameterizations with and without inside money can
be quite diﬀerent. Thus, using structures incorporating or not incorporating endogenous trade
imbalances can have a signiﬁcant impact on model implications for optimal commercial policy.
We also report sensitivity analysis for elasticity parameters. We conclude by suggesting that in
today’s world where large countries such as China and the US run large surpluses and deﬁcits
recognizing these in analyses of their commercial policy is important.
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